Introduction:
Sea lines of communication are not only ships doing almost all global transport of tonnage/mile since millennia cheaper than land transport (by a factor of 20-25 over bodies of water like lakes and seas and a factor of 4-5 along running water such as rivers). They include the transmission of messages via underwater cables. Laying these underwater cables was one of the most important endeavours for centralized control of the late colonial empires. It created a world of information exchange, an unequal exchange of improved control and exploitation by the developed and civilized world, but nonetheless.
Sea lines of communication are not only ships doing almost all global transport of tonnage/mile since millennia cheaper than land transport (by a factor of 20-25 over bodies of water like lakes and seas and a factor of 4-5 along running water such as rivers). They include the transmission of messages via underwater cables. Laying these underwater cables was one of the most important endeavours for centralized control of the late colonial empires. It created a world of information exchange, an unequal exchange of improved control and exploitation by the developed and civilized world, but nonetheless.
http://www.atlantic-cable.com/
is an informative webpage on submarine cables and source for the maps.
http://www.subtelforum.com/articles/magazine/subscriptions/
is an online magazine with extensive information on submarine cables.
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The All Red
Line - The Annals and Aims of the Pacific Cable Project
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http://www.atlantic-cable.com/ :Carte générale des grandes communications
télégraphiques du monde, 1901/03
International Telegraph Bureau (Berne, Switzerland)
International Telegraph Bureau (Berne, Switzerland)
Even our internet today makes use of the same approach of underwater
cables for global connections. Half the readership of this blog must use
underwater data transfer and the other half will be rooted this way from time
to time despite geographic proximity because the underwater fibre optic cables
are the information highways between different data processing clusters.
Older systems transmitting electric impulses had quite a struggle with the Baud
rate because of the electromagnetic field in such a high-density long distance
environment.
All sea lines of communication enter specific hubs, harbours. The smaller a vessel is, the more hubs it can use. this has been used for trade networking as well as warfare. Viking long ships or military hovercrafts are designs for beaching at every possible location for what is termed amphibious warfare. Trading boats, barges can beach in a lot more places than sea-going ships and use the water-earth intersection for cargo transfers. The usual transport is to installations on solid ground, harbours, and rarely to floating installations that are usually ships of war or few barge carrier ships. Size and corresponding access to a selection of harbours restrict all kinds of ships. At the same time size enables to stay at sea for longer time and thus cover longer distances at less energy requirements. A ship grows cubic in load carrying capacity while energy requirements grow approximately square and the very cheap substances burned for modern ship transport are still a very significant fraction of the total floating mass.
Such exchange advantages enhance disposable income (economic Ricardo-model) and for this reason human settlement patterns do follow choices of environmental resources and exchange capabilities for personal benefits. You'll find harbours associated with rivers from the hinterland and people traditionally settling with highest density at places with running or standing bodies of water that enable(d) mass-transport of goods on boats or ships. The land-sea intersection is the place where most humans live(d).
Aspirations of the archetypes
Archetypes of three different economic systems:
networking (in 1913 the British Empire)
know-how (in 1913 the French Republic)
means of production (in 1913 the Russian Empire)
Land is associated with resources and infrastructure
that both together enable to operate the means of production. Know-how is
bonded to human individuals and utilized as organized human groups to work with
available means of production.
Humans with their know-how and ability to learn can
transfer from one land to another, but require integration in an infrastructure
and organized human group in order to utilize their capabilities.
Networking uses the uneven distribution of means of
production to organize exchange for mutual benefit of all three sides and does
have their own know-how on how to handle these human interactions. Ships and
boats have for most of human history been the most economic tools for exchange
in goods and information.
Power on land is about control of physical structures
such as infrastructure and natural resources. Enforced know-how control does
not work well, because it operates within an organized human group and
diminished voluntary participation decreases group efficiency.
Sea power starts as a protection from network access
via the sea lines of communication and can evolve into a capability to
interdict and protect sea lines of communication on a global scale. Since the
early 20th century the split between information and
material goods transfer through sea lines of communication has become most
evident. The numerous underwater cables are constant communication lines across
the sea utilized to do the information part of human exchange, including
business communication. Today ships are not the exclusive communication tool
over sea, but just one part for intermittent transfer of goods, while pipelines
serve for constant transfer of a limited range of goods. Assessing sea power by
looking at ship numbers and production is misleading in an environment with
increasingly important maritime data transfer. For example a lot of (by now
traditional) maritime traffic is the information transfer between the London
and New York stock exchange.
Know-how is personal; means of production are (mostly)
territorial. People with know-how do live on land in localized groups and the
direction of land power was to acquire both in an as autarkic combination as
possible. The longing for autarky would have changed the negotiation capability
via networking sea powers that played a most important role in keeping uneven
distributions of know-how and means of production connected for triple mutual benefits.
The networking effort to create working human interactions can be
underestimated and is in my opinion the key reason, why Germany failed in two
world wars and still has to struggle with the toxic memory fallout in mind
bombs with decreasing substance. The first of these wars was about German
network aspirations, while the second one was meant to maximize means of
production. Each case would have created a broader triangle and thus a more
robust self-reliant structure, suitable for their European hegemonic dream.
Concepts
From a security perspective the bodies of water have been (US-)classified in a three tier system:
blue water - the open ocean without nearby land
green water - maritime body of water with nearby land that allows force projection from the land
brown water - non-salt water such as rivers and lakes with a very strong force projection from the very nearby land
anti-access/area-denial (a2/ad) is the attempt to keep out unwanted visitors. It’s nowadays most often discussed as hostile measures and threats directed against the US navy in green waters.
From a security perspective the bodies of water have been (US-)classified in a three tier system:
blue water - the open ocean without nearby land
green water - maritime body of water with nearby land that allows force projection from the land
brown water - non-salt water such as rivers and lakes with a very strong force projection from the very nearby land
anti-access/area-denial (a2/ad) is the attempt to keep out unwanted visitors. It’s nowadays most often discussed as hostile measures and threats directed against the US navy in green waters.
Sovereignty
in maritime terms
The area access area-denial approach is the next logical step in shifting from brown water (end of colonialism) to green water control as in green water runs the highest density of most important traffic, traditionally represented by an own class of coastal non-high sea ships.
Historic examples are Alfred the Great's fleet or Charlemagne's defence program, both directed by Christian monarchs against heathen Viking raids. It's discussed whether their notorious attacks were in part a response to the Frankish raids against Denmark after the bloody conquest and Christianisation of Saxony and other neighbours.
The area access area-denial approach is the next logical step in shifting from brown water (end of colonialism) to green water control as in green water runs the highest density of most important traffic, traditionally represented by an own class of coastal non-high sea ships.
Historic examples are Alfred the Great's fleet or Charlemagne's defence program, both directed by Christian monarchs against heathen Viking raids. It's discussed whether their notorious attacks were in part a response to the Frankish raids against Denmark after the bloody conquest and Christianisation of Saxony and other neighbours.
Ever since
the entry of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean, the nations of the
Indo-Pacific have (with few exceptions) suffered from the inferiority of the
naval armament they could muster in comparison to the powers from the shores of
the Atlantic. During the Age of Sail, the Atlantic sea powers were still quite
impressed by the Indo-Pacific Oceans craftsmen's capability to copy their own
designs and even deliver good quality at lower prices. The reasons for the
fundamental shifts in power have more causes than guns and ships that were both
copied. Arming the periphery by Emrys Chew is a study on how the weapons
from the Atlantic shores changed the (extended) Indian Ocean coasts. While the
Indo-Pacific early on was capable of producing similar items, they did not have
the same mass-production development that made the Atlantic centres of Europe
and America the main suppliers of armament. The limits to European dominance
can be seen with a naval lens, the price for permanent brown water control
became too high.
Next step to maintain the original economic trade advantages without the economic burden of administration and “civilization” were local banana republics with differing degrees of independence.
Next step to maintain the original economic trade advantages without the economic burden of administration and “civilization” were local banana republics with differing degrees of independence.
Most people resent
unequal contracts and try to improve their chances in live. This happens on
individual as well as in networked group levels (the latest example is the Arab
Spring that had long been prepared and pushed for by the regions educated
younger generations). Herein lies a core problem, the cooperation with the
local cleptocracy that makes the still world-dominating Atlantic powers bad boy
imperialists of exploitation and oppression. From theory to practice, how else
do you run stable contracts that serve your interest in such an environment?
It's a blame game.
The German High Sea Fleet (of rather coastal hull design) is an example of a politically charged "green water" navy meant to be blue. It not only served military, but more important political purposes of self-perception within the concert of European powers. The naming and design highlight the delusional character of these ambitions.
China’s green water navy's defeats triggered a long 19th/20th century with most profound impact. It even did away with the Son of Heaven, for millennia the pillar of Chinese states. While losing her many battles during these times, China was no way unaware or unable to acquire Western military technology. It's not the weapon, but the human that makes the difference and that human operates within an organization as part of a society. Nowadays, improving green water control against three of the most powerful navies of the world in direct proximity, the US navy, the Japanese navy and Republic of Korea navy is a dead sure giveaway for world domination dreams and can no way be sold as national security measures to their populace (any irony?).
US-today
The German High Sea Fleet (of rather coastal hull design) is an example of a politically charged "green water" navy meant to be blue. It not only served military, but more important political purposes of self-perception within the concert of European powers. The naming and design highlight the delusional character of these ambitions.
China’s green water navy's defeats triggered a long 19th/20th century with most profound impact. It even did away with the Son of Heaven, for millennia the pillar of Chinese states. While losing her many battles during these times, China was no way unaware or unable to acquire Western military technology. It's not the weapon, but the human that makes the difference and that human operates within an organization as part of a society. Nowadays, improving green water control against three of the most powerful navies of the world in direct proximity, the US navy, the Japanese navy and Republic of Korea navy is a dead sure giveaway for world domination dreams and can no way be sold as national security measures to their populace (any irony?).
US-today
The rise and current position of the USA can be
attributed to means of production in a lucrative infrastructure for humans with
know-how and ability to learn to emigrate to and rise quickly. Not every
immigrant stayed in the US despite the positive economic network feedback it
could provide. An own distribution network developed for the high local
productivity that in turn created increasing US interest in foreign affairs. United Fruit and the First Barbary War are keywords for
research on this complex field. Switching to a dominant naval power position
during WWII came along with growing financial power utilized over the Atlantic
underwater communication cables.
Today, the US has a tiny merchant fleet in comparison
to Panama (due to legal loopholes). Comparing the underwater cable information
traffic to the US naval investments makes them proportional to their role as
the maritime connected global information exchange hub. The shipping of old is
becoming a growing, but secondary maritime traffic business. (http://worldoceanreview.com/en/transport/global-shipping/).
The output of the high numbers of educated academics is information that can be
sent over these underwater cables. The academics are on average paid much
higher per working hour than the local factory workers that produce the
material goods that travel by ship. I have yet not found a study on the values
of maritime traffic that includes and compares the underwater cables with
shipping and pipelines, although the necessity for these investments to pay off
speaks volumes.
The global US (-Navy)
Currently, there's only one un-opposable power with a very significant capability for global control of blue water sea lines of communication via large and small carriers - the US navy. They do have giant aircraft carriers and double that with amphibious warfare ships that can serve in a sea control role. None so far claims to have found a solution that outclasses the ship fighting capabilities of these large super carriers with their manned fixed wing fighter bombers. In summary there's none capable of challenging US aspirations of blue water control anywhere on the globe. Global traffic can hardly avoid not using blue water shipping lines. While the capability to interdict each and every use of the sea is impossible, the pirates of the African coast highlight that, shipping through openly hostile waters with well-armed interdicting navy force drive up the prices to hardly affordable levels. Iran's games around the Strait of Hormuz pale in comparison.
This known capability at exchange control can be applied without open declaration of hostilities or recognizable boots on the ground. Constant network-manipulation, due to sea power and lesser capabilities for uncheckable impact on the core (sea) lines of communication is the essence of naval power exercise. If your game is network manipulation it's most logical to enhance this standing by synergetic cross-effects with other fields like critical resource access and financial networks. Altogether it creates a cluster with highest profits from all human exchanges and a corresponding disposable income that can be invested into the assets for that status.
Concerning the green water, this dominant blue water power also has significant assets to make an imprint in the highest traffic density environment. The usual modern combination for amphibious warfare, not expecting to be provided harbour access by the inhabitants of a region under attack, is a large long endurance vessel (LDP, LHA, LHD and some LST) with much smaller boats (hovercrafts and catamarans) or aircrafts (helicopters and tilt rotors) for landing at as many spots as possible and thus remain unpredictable raiders (the essence of amphibious warfare since ancient times). Because people live near the places they work and most people on earth live and work near the sea shore, this is the place where destruction can be wrought by these raids and always has been. Constant destruction does have economic long-term impacts and destabilizes any opponent with a higher degree of willingness for confrontation by the leadership than by the suffering population. If highest traffic density regions are not safe, the resulting exclusion from exchange network benefits provides one sided economic advantage that expensive attempts at autarky can hardly compensate.
Currently, there's only one un-opposable power with a very significant capability for global control of blue water sea lines of communication via large and small carriers - the US navy. They do have giant aircraft carriers and double that with amphibious warfare ships that can serve in a sea control role. None so far claims to have found a solution that outclasses the ship fighting capabilities of these large super carriers with their manned fixed wing fighter bombers. In summary there's none capable of challenging US aspirations of blue water control anywhere on the globe. Global traffic can hardly avoid not using blue water shipping lines. While the capability to interdict each and every use of the sea is impossible, the pirates of the African coast highlight that, shipping through openly hostile waters with well-armed interdicting navy force drive up the prices to hardly affordable levels. Iran's games around the Strait of Hormuz pale in comparison.
This known capability at exchange control can be applied without open declaration of hostilities or recognizable boots on the ground. Constant network-manipulation, due to sea power and lesser capabilities for uncheckable impact on the core (sea) lines of communication is the essence of naval power exercise. If your game is network manipulation it's most logical to enhance this standing by synergetic cross-effects with other fields like critical resource access and financial networks. Altogether it creates a cluster with highest profits from all human exchanges and a corresponding disposable income that can be invested into the assets for that status.
Concerning the green water, this dominant blue water power also has significant assets to make an imprint in the highest traffic density environment. The usual modern combination for amphibious warfare, not expecting to be provided harbour access by the inhabitants of a region under attack, is a large long endurance vessel (LDP, LHA, LHD and some LST) with much smaller boats (hovercrafts and catamarans) or aircrafts (helicopters and tilt rotors) for landing at as many spots as possible and thus remain unpredictable raiders (the essence of amphibious warfare since ancient times). Because people live near the places they work and most people on earth live and work near the sea shore, this is the place where destruction can be wrought by these raids and always has been. Constant destruction does have economic long-term impacts and destabilizes any opponent with a higher degree of willingness for confrontation by the leadership than by the suffering population. If highest traffic density regions are not safe, the resulting exclusion from exchange network benefits provides one sided economic advantage that expensive attempts at autarky can hardly compensate.
Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany both fell into a complete autarky
delusion, while Revolutionary France and the German Empire both managed to
survive by obtainable autarky in manufacture of chemical oxidizers for
explosives. By contrast, the German synthetic fuel production during WWII,
situated near rivers and coasts, was bombed to inefficiency by the Western
allies
This is not about the strategic blunders that hindered world aspirations
by clever people acting according to their mindset. It’s about doomed attempts
to achieve objectives without mutual agreements with wars serving as extreme
negotiation measure. The multiple levels of resistance and cooperation people
can express beyond organized, uniformed and armed violence are no trivial
problem. Networking is a mindset and not a technology approach to this problem
and it was never devoid of differing levels at coercion that are enacted with
less friction via the naval domain.
Expeditionary Strike Group 3 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/images/lhd-4-arg2.jpg
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